oh teh noes!
Sorry blog. I've been super busy. I've been ignoring you. It's just that with the end of finals, and moving back home, and getting a job and stuff... well... you've been pushed to the side. But it's not going to happen anymore. You're important to me blog and I haven't been showing it. I'm going to make time for you from now on.
::tearfully hugs his monitor::
So anyways, I've been super busy. Like I told the blog, I got a job working at a BP terminal. I basically do grunt work. On Tuesday I got to move 55 gallon drums filled with sludge and stuff all day long. It was like... 95 degrees and really sunny, so I almost died. My face is still scarred with radiation burns from the sun. The rest of the time I'm just painting stuff. I paint the loading racks for the gas tankers all day long. It's just me, a brush, glossy white enamel, and hundreds of feet of pipe for 8 hours. It's not bad though. I get $8 an hour without taxes (yay random seasonal worker status that exempts me from tax!), so that's excellent.
I also lost the password for my blog. Then blogger wasn't quick about sending it to me, so I waited for a while and then yelled at them about it. Obviously that was resolved, so no problem there.
Oh! In addition to being the President of the Rifle Club, I'm now the Secretary of Phi Alpha Theta, the history honors society at OSU. Before you get excited I think you should know that I ran against one other person, and we were filling 6 positions with a pool of 5 people. It was inevitable that I would win.
I got two B+'s and an A- this quarter. Stupid OSU and their + - system! They're all in the 90+ range. At my old school, I would have had a 4.0. Bah! Oh well, I guess a B+ is still pretty good. Next quarter I'll be able to dominate. I'll have two histories and latin 102. I also bought the Latin version of The Gallic War on Amazon the other day, so I'll be struggling through that over the summer.
I haven't continued work on my thesis yet, but I'm still getting used to work. The first couple of days I came home at 5:30 and sat next to the AC for a while, but I should adapt soon enough. All that painting also gives my mind lots of time to wander around and think about stuff. If I can focus it on the development of the Christian war ethos, I should be set.
Finally, I've been busy painting my mechs. My friends and I play Battletech, a wargame about giant robots and stuff. It's nerdy to be sure, but it's good for relieving stress
and there are cool robots, which are always fun. Here are a few that I've painted recently. They're only about 1.5 inches high, so I'm pretty proud of the level of detail I can get to.
Desert camoTwo-shade generic camoOlive DrabAnother kind of ODThe figure for the picture you see on the right sidebar!Alright, that's enough links. I have to go clean the paint out of my hair and scrub the grime off my face so I can be presentable to go play pool at the corner bar.
Sweet!
Paper 2/3 is finished. It was pretty easy once I made myself start writing it. I also used several different sources this time so my readers wouldn't think ill of my academic skill. Oh, that was an awesome rhyme.
Without further delay, here is the 10 page paper assessing the security of Louisiana to terrorist attack!
Jon Zuhosky
International Studies 501
Final Paper
When possible locations are thought of for a terrorist strike, Louisiana doesn’t immediately spring to mind. Places like the White House, the Empire State Building, and The Golden Gate Bridge seem to be ideal targets because of their symbolic value, but while the World Trade Center and Pentagon were chosen for their symbolism, they were also chosen to cripple the economy and military. A state like Louisiana offers a much greater potential for destruction and disruption despite its lack of famous landmarks.
Conceivably, every building, road, or bridge in Louisiana could be the target of a terrorist strike, but the likelihood of this is small. There are a few targets however that, if attacked, have the great potential for asymmetrical destruction. Louisiana is home to two nuclear plants that could be attacked in any manner of ways. One of the world’s largest and busiest ports is also in Louisiana, which is in turn connected to one of the busiest waterways in the world. A collection of chemical plants along the Mississippi River known as the chemical corridor is also a prime target for a terrorist attack. Finally, there are a number of targets with cultural significance. While these targets do not offer the possibility of crippling crucial infrastructures, they would certainly generate fear and draw media coverage.
Louisiana has two nuclear power plants in its boundaries that are at risk for a terrorist attack. River Bend 1 is a boiling water reactor with an output of 966 MWe and is located only 24 miles away from Baton Rouge.
[1] Waterford 3, a pressurized water reactor with a larger output of 1075 MWe, is only 20 miles from New Orleans.
[2] Both of these plants are open to a wide variety of assaults from terrorist groups.
A September 11th style attack against these plants might not destroy the containment dome around the reactor core, but other buildings at the plant are vulnerable. In this scenario multiple systems could be destroyed at once, destroying any redundancy built into the system, and leaving the reactor unprotected from overheating or other hazards.
[3] Also, other buildings on the site contain dangerous radioactive materials that, in the event of a catastrophic explosion, could be spewed into the atmosphere as jet fuel burned.
The nuclear plants are also a target for groups of terrorist commandos. Plant guards are not trained to face a highly motivated force of fanatics, and might not be able to prevent a team from gaining access to a nuclear facility. Once inside, these terrorists could plant bombs on critical structures, hold the building and its occupants hostage, or even steal highly enriched uranium for use in a radiological dispersal device, commonly known as a dirty bomb.
Another threat that faces Louisiana is the danger of an attack on their large chemical industry. As of 2000, Louisiana had 369 fixed-site facilities
[4] that contained hazardous chemicals. Also, many of these facilities are located closely to heavily populated residential areas. These sites have experienced accidents in the past that help to show what a deliberate attack would look like.
An accident in October 1995 involving the accidental explosion of railroad car full of rocket fuel resulted in a mushroom cloud of poison gas. “The accident resulted in the evacuation of 3,000 people, injuries to 4,700, and hospitalization of 81.”
[5] Another accident in 1997 involving a barge striking a bridge led to the leakage of 10,000 gallons of pyrolysis gasoline. Schools and businesses in Baton Rouge had to be evacuated because of the fear of benzene fumes. Finally, a derailment of hazardous materials in 2000 caused $35 million in damages and forced 3,500 people to evacuate the nearby area. All of this was simply the result of defective joint bars on the railroad tracks.
[6] If accidents can cause this much damage, imagine the result of a planned attack.
Two targets of significant symbolic value in Louisiana are the Superdome in New Orleans and the yearly Mardi gras celebration. The Superdome frequently hosts the Super Bowl, an event that is televised live across the globe. The Superdome also hosts the Sugar Bowl, one of the largest college bowl games of the year. If terrorists struck during these events, they would be able to reach a massive audience. Mardi gras is also a prime target for terrorists wishing to get their message heard. The event serves as a tangible example of what many terrorist groups see as the degenerate and morally corrupt Western world. For religious fanatics, a strike against a modern day Sodom and Gomorrah would be a stunning achievement.
Louisiana’s major airport, the Louis Armstrong International Airport, is a prime target for terrorists looking to carry out a 9/11 style attack. By taking over a plane that is fully loaded with fuel, a terrorist group would have several target options nearby. The plane could be flown into the Superdome, the two nuclear plants nearby, or into any of the many chemical plants and refineries throughout the state. The plane could even be flown into a bridge over a crucial waterway to cripple commercial traffic. Finally, the possibility for regular hijackings remains as a dangerous threat.
The most serious threat to Louisiana comes from its massive ports and waterways. The Port of South Louisiana alone handles 52 million tons of cargo each year. The cargo is moved in container boxes that undergo very little inspection. A terrorist could buy a container for $3000-$5000 anywhere in the world, package a nuclear weapon inside, lock the door, and wait for it to arrive in a US port. Once the weapon reached the port, the terrorist could simply detonate it via remote control, destroying the port and spreading radiation throughout the city.
[7] As frightening as this scenario is, it is only the tip of the iceberg when it comes to an attack with a shipping container. A devastated port and city would be hard enough to cope with, but much like the shutdown of all commercial air traffic after the attacks of September 11th; all commercial shipping into the US would be stopped. If the shipping was not resumed within 2-3 weeks, the entire system would become bogged down and almost impossible to fix.
[8] America’s economy would be severely crippled and it would quickly spread throughout the world. Even if the bomb didn’t explode properly or with its full yield, the President would have to consider the presence of other terrorist weapons on other ships. Terrorists would no doubt exacerbate the situation by bluffing about other nuclear weapons hidden throughout the merchant fleet.
Fortunately there are a wide variety of solutions to help combat the threat posed by terrorists to Louisiana. The threat facing nuclear plants can be parried successfully with a combination of cheap and easy to implement solutions. First, while these facilities have detailed protocols to follow in the event of systems failure, there is little that is planned to deal with the outcome of terrorist attacks. Training the workers at the nuclear power plants to deal will terrorist threats or sabotage is an easy and inexpensive way to upgrade security.
Radioactive materials that are stored on site but not under the protection of a thick containment wall should be moved or secured to make an airplane attack less likely to cause any real damage. Anti-radiation drugs should be stockpiled in the area surrounding the plant so that, in the event of a radioactive dispersal, the fewest number of people will be affected. The security staff and workers at these plants should be routinely tested and rewarded or punished based on their performance.
[9] Finally, a system of monitoring stations should be erected around the plants and large cities to immediately detect radiation that is present in the air from an attack.
[10] The chemical industry can also be made more secure through a few simple security measures. There is a real need for the government to step in and force chemical companies to adopt safer policies. Without these mandatory new rules, companies will be forced by the market to travel down the dangerous road that Union Carbide did in Bhopal. There will not be a “tragedy of the commons” or another Bhopal if there is a federal or state mandate. Some of these policies could include replacing hazardous materials with less dangerous chemicals, storing those toxic chemicals that can’t be replaced in lower concentrations, and placing buffer zones around chemical plants to mitigate the effects of any toxic release. Furthermore, Stephen Flynn suggests that all vessels carrying hazardous chemicals be fitted with a GPS tracker.
[11] They could be routed away from populated areas and have the added benefit for a company of being able to locate any of its trucks whenever it wanted.
Security at the Superdome and Mardi gras would simply be an extension of the current systems. For the Super Bowl and other large sporting events at the Superdome, a no-fly zone should be established around the stadium and be guarded by a combat air patrol. The jet fighters will already be in the area for the pre-game flyby, so keeping them on station will be an easy task. Security measures in place to keep people from bringing in beverages and large containers could be ratcheted up for these special games to make sure that people are screened for weapons. The costs for these added security measures would easily be covered by the influx of commerce directly related to the game. Mardi gras presents a more difficult problem. The event is porous and by its own nature not receptive to strict rules and regulations, but an increased police presence will help to deter terrorists from striking, and the added police will be on hand to deal with any disturbances that are not terror-related.
Since 9/11 many security measures have been put in place at airports in Louisiana, but most of them have been ineffective. From a widely publicized incident involving the poor treatment of John Finn, an elderly MOH recipient, to the closing of a concourse because of an unattended box of gumbo
[12], the piecemeal attempts at security in Louisiana airports have done little but cause headaches and embarrassment. The reinforcement of cockpit doors is the only security measure of any real substance to come out of the 9/11 attacks and this should be followed up by simple measures in the airport like more screener training and a way to evaluate security personnel. With a system in place to train and promote the best screeners, the entire process could be improved and streamlined. Also the very nature of the 9/11 attacks will help to keep the flight crew and passengers of a hijacked plane from letting terrorists take control of the airliner.
Since it is the greatest threat to Louisiana and the nation as a whole, port security deserves the most attention. As it is, there are very few security measures in place that would stop or even slow down a terrorist attack though a shipping container. Furthermore, there are attempts to enforce security measures that would be ineffective and damaging to the industry which must be abandoned. Luckily there are several new policies that would have security as well as productivity benefits, making the implementation of such policies easier for a shipping company.
Firstly, containers should be equipped with a variety of sensor systems that can track the container’s location as well as the status of anything inside. These sensors could be used to detect anything from the CO2 levels inside of a container that would indicate the presence of a human being inside, to different radiation levels that could detect a nuclear bomb or RDD. Perhaps placing something as simple as a small ECM device that jammed cell phone signals inside of the container would prevent the bomb from being remotely detonated. The cost of these sensors would not be prohibitive at all. It is estimated that the lifetime cost of sensors for a container would be $250; factoring in the average lifetime of a container, this would only add $5 to the price of each shipment,
[13] a trivial sum compared to the increased security.
These sensors would also have the added benefit of increasing productivity. In fact, the tracking and load information would help the shipping company know when the container was empty and ready to be shipped back to the company immediately. These new changes would result in a 20% increase in productivity.
[14] The increased knowledge on the whereabouts of containers and their loads also helps to curtail theft, which would result in lower insurance premiums for the whole industry.
The issue of enforcement is hardly a problem either. By utilizing a carrot and stick approach, the government can reward those companies that adopt the new technology with faster and cheaper turnaround at the port. The same idea is behind the EZ Pass system in the Northeastern US where drivers pay in advance for an electronic ID that is attached to the car and lets them avoid lines at toll booths. Rewarding those shipping companies that adopt the safer technologies with faster service and punishing companies who use the bare minimum in security with delays and inspections will result in an industry-wide push for the new technology.
[15] There should also be a push for the advancement of scanning technology on a large scale. Much like an X-ray machine at an airport scans luggage, so too should there be a system to scan entire containers for tell-tale signs of radiation or radiation shielding material. This will be more costly than the other security systems, but as the technology is perfected, the costs will go down. The state government might object, but they could simply be reminded of the fallout that would result when, after a nuclear attack in a port, an enraged public finds out that measures that could have prevented it were shelved because of their cost. The ports will also help with the costs because they know all too well the cost of a massive port shutdown in the aftermath of an attack. Finally, the Department of Homeland Security will shoulder a large portion of the burden because the threat is not limited to Louisiana alone, but to the security of the entire nation.
This new technology will not be 100% accurate all the time, nor will it be without glitches and bugs. For instance, the radiation sensors already in place have a habit of mistaking the trace amounts in kitty litter for weapons grade uranium.
[16] With continued research and testing, these bugs will be worked out and the system will become more efficient and cost-effective. Besides, the radiation portals will only be one part of the security system. The combination of container-mounted sensors, express shipping lanes, and the radiation portals will achieve a higher level of security together than any of them could achieve alone. And because there will be a few relatively reliable systems in place instead of one alone, there will be more security if one of the systems goes down.
In the event that all of these preventative systems fail and a terrorist detonates a nuclear device inside of a port, perhaps on a ship without all the newly required security systems, the effects of the attack can be mitigated by a stockpile of anti-radiation drugs similar to those that would be required at nuclear facilities. Also like at nuclear plants, dock workers and local first responders should train frequently on how to grapple with the very real possibility of a nuclear attack. The network of container information could be used by the government to quickly assess which containers were secure and the process of reopening America’s ports would be able to proceed much quicker and smoother, resulting in less of an economic effect from the attack.
The FBI, CIA, Customs, Immigrations, Coast Guard, and local police and fire departments around the ports must be able to work together effectively. The pre 9/11 barriers that existed between departments must be completely taken down and replaced with an effective communications network. If Customs notices something odd about a cargo manifest it should be able to inform the Coast Guard and have them stop the ship. If the FBI or CIA finds information of a terrorist plot, local authorities must be immediately notified in order to prevent or mitigate an attack. These new networks can also be justified by the effectiveness that they would have in preventing illegal immigration and the smuggling of drugs and other contraband.
In conclusion, defending Louisiana from attack is not an easy prospect. In a state as large as Louisiana there are a myriad of possible targets. Attention must be given to the defense of nuclear plants from outright destruction to the covert theft of materials. Chemical plants must be guarded because of their propensity to change from a peaceful and beneficial enterprise to the source of a massive chemical attack within an instant of being struck by terrorists. Important cultural sites must be protected from attack so that terrorists cannot strike in front of a world-wide audience. Finally, the most attention must be given to protecting the ports of Louisiana. They are the most vulnerable to attack and their destruction or disruption would have the farthest reaching effects.
The key to securing the state is to identify those targets that are most vulnerable and then defend them with the most cost-effective, efficient, and least disruptive security measures. Rather than defending with one excellent but expensive system, a layered defense should be adopted. It will not be without difficulties, but defending Louisiana from terrorist attack is crucial not only to the citizens of the state, but to the citizens of the nation and the entire world.
[1] http://www.nrc.gov/info-finder/reactor/rbs1.html (accessed 5-24-05)
[2] http://www.nrc.gov/info-finder/reactor/wat3.html (accessed 5-24-05)
[3] The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism, pg. 215
[4] http://www.ohsep.louisiana.gov/disrecovery/hazardprofiles/LouisianaHazardProfiles.pdfSection 12.1 (accessed 5-25-05)
[5] Ibid Section 12.2 (accessed 5-25-05)
[6] Ibid Section 12.2 (accessed 5-25-05)
[7] America The Vulnerable, pp 88
[8] Ibid, pp 83
[9] The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism, pp. 249
[10] Ibid, pg. 296
[11] America The Vulnerable, pp. 121
[12] http://www.bellaonline.com/articles/art936.asp
(accessed 5-31-05)
[13] America The Vulnerable, pp. 100
[14] Ibid, pp. 100
[15] Ibid, pp 102-3
[16] http://www.defensetech.org/archives/001065.html(accessed 5-31-05)
That's a lot of footnotes! Now all I have to do is write up a short abstract for the cover page and I'll be done. Then all I'll have between me and summer vacation is a 10 page paper about the 9/11 commission's recommendations and a pesky Latin final.
